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THE ORIGINAL INTENTION OF ORIGINAL
UNDERSTANDING*
Jack N. Rakove**
In 1985, amid mounting interest in the idea of a return to a
"jurisprudence of original intention," the Harvard Law Review
published H. Jefferson Powell's important article on "The Original Understanding of Original Intent."l In this acute and ironic
criticism of the theory of originalism, Powell argued that the
modern notion which equates the intention of a legal document
with the subjective purposes of its author(s) was not part of the
interpretive arsenal on which the framers of the Constitution
could draw as they tried to imagine how its provisions would be
construed. Although some eighteenth-century commentators
understood that interpretation should strive to recover the purposes of the parties to a legal document, in practice that intention
was almost always both reducible to and discoverable in its explicit language. There was no notion or tradition of construing a
statute by examining its legislative history. In case of ambiguity,
interpreters might consider the purposes declared in the preamble, but they relied far more on the rules of common law adjudication. Knowledge of the intention of a statute, Powell
concluded, was far less a guide to interpretation than its product,
an understanding formed and refined over time through a course
of reasoning and practice. And when something like a theory of
intention did emerge in the realm of constitutional interpretation, Powell observed, it was tied to the states' -rights "doctrine of
1798," which made the quasi-sovereign states the contracting parties to the federal union. Powell thus linked the appearance of
an intentionalist theory of constitutional intepretation to the
great heresy that the Civil War ostensibly laid to rest.
* This article is a revised version of Jack N. Rakove, "Madison and the Origins of
Originalism," Original Meamngs: Politics and Ideas in the Making of the Constitution 33965 (Alfred A. Knopf 1996). I owe a scholarly debt to H. Jefferson Powell and Charles
Lofgren for framing the basic issues I consider here.
** Professor of History, Stanford University.
1. H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 Harv. L.
Rev. 885 (1985) in Jack N. Rakove, ed., Interpreting the Constitution: The Debate Over
Original Intent 53 (Northwestern U. Press, 1990).
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Persuasive as it seemed, Powell's argument proved vulnerable to serious criticism. Reviewing Powell's use of sources,
Charles Lofgren discovered a cavalier approach to the historical
evidence.z More important, Lofgren argued that Powell erred in
limiting his inquiry to the relevance of the intentions of the framers of the Constitution while ignoring the understandings of its
ratifiers. Some disputants in the political debates of the 1790s,
Lofgren concluded, clearly thought that the expectations, understandings, and intentions of the ratifiers could serve as a restraint
on doubtful constructions of the Constitution. Nor could it be
taken for granted, Lofgren implied, that early interpreters
thought that the Constitution should be read quite like a statute,
contract, or will, subject to the familiar rules of common law adjudication. The Constitution certainly was a kind of law, but not
any kind of law; and its true intepretation might plausibly follow
other rules. Lofgren agreed with Powell that knowledge of the
intentions of the framers at Philadelphia was not thought an appropriate guide to interpretation, but that reservation did not apply to the intentions-or perhaps we should say the
understandings-of its ratifiers.
No piece of historical evidence looms larger in this ratifierunderstanding variant of originalism than a speech that congressman James Madison gave in April 1796, when the House of Representatives was debating its constitutional role in the
implementation of the controversial Jay Treaty. In this speech,
Madison excluded evidence of the intentions of the framers at
Philadelphia from the canon of acceptable sources, but at the
same time he affirmed that evidence of what the Constitution
meant to its legal ratifiers in the state conventions was pertinent.
But, after all, whatever veneration might be entertained for
the body of men who formed our constitution. the sense of
that body could never be regarded as the oracular guide in the
expounding the constitution. As the instrument came from
them, it was nothing more than the draught of a plan, nothing
but a dead letter, until life and validity were breathed into it,
by the voice of the people, speaking through the several state
conventions. If we were to look therefore, for the meaning of
the instrument, beyond the face of the instrument, we must
look for it not in the general convention, which proposed, but

2. Charles A. Lofgren, The Original Understanding of Original Intent?, 5 Const.
Comm. 77 (1988) in Rakove, ed., Interpreting the Constitution at 117 (cited in note 1).
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in the state conventions, which accepted and ratified the
constitution)

Madison's statement distills the crucial premise of originalism:
The Constitution is supreme law because it rests on the direct
imprimatur of a sovereign people, expressed through the extraordinary procedures required for ratification; and its original
meaning, whenever it can be recovered, should accordingly prevail over the lesser acts of legislators and the preferences of
jurists.
But can Madison's statement indeed be taken by itself, as a
sufficient early expression of a valid theory of originalism?
While Powell and Lofgren both cite Madison's speech, neither
locates it in the political context in which it was originally given.
Restoring Madison's speech to the political circumstances of
1796, however, has the effect of converting its apparently robust
statement of originalism into a weak, even muddled effort to
blunt the Federalist counterattack against Republican criticism of
the Jay Treaty. Nor is Madison's endorsement of ratifier-understanding in 1796 easily reconciled with his own original understanding of the character of the ratification debates of 1787-1788,
which he had then described in disparaging terms. To trace the
path that Madison followed from principal framer of the Constitution to founding father of originalism thus offers a fascinating
commentary on the political character of early constitutional
interpretation.
In one essential respect, Powell's argument certainly rests on
firm historical ground. One searches the voluminous records of
the debates of 1787-1788 almost in vain for evidence that the
framers and ratifiers imagined that later interpreters would examine the extant documentary sources for the "great national
discussion" of 1787-1788 as an aid to determining what the Constitution originally meant.4 In the rare instances when such references appear, their use tends to confirm Powell's basic point.
Consider, for example, Hamilton's efforts in Federalist 33 to
answer the "virulent invective and petulant declamation" that
Anti-Federalists were directing against the necessary and proper
3. J. Madison, speech of Apr. 6, 1796, in J.C.A. Stagg, ed., 16 The Papers of James
Madison 290, 295-96 (U. Press of Virginia, 1989).
4. The phrase is Hamilton's in Federalist 1 (Hamilton) in Jacob E. Cooke, ed., The
Federalist Papers 3, 5 (Wesleyan U. Press, 1%1). It was most recently borrowed by Isaac
Kramnick for his essay, The "Great National Discussion": The Discourse of Politics in
1787, 45 Wm. & Mary Q. 3 (1988).
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clause.s This "sweeping clause"6 would in fact obviate the need
for "construction" without enlarging the powers the Constitution
vested in Congress, Hamilton argued. But suppose Congress
wrongly impinged the authority of a state. The "forced constructions" needed to support such palpably unconstitutional acts
would be so apparent that "the people" could then readily "appeal to the standard they have formed" -the Constitution"and take such measures to redress the injury done to the Constitution, as the exigency may suggest and prudence justify."7 "If
there should ever be a doubt on this head," he concluded, "the
credit of it will be entirely due to those reasoners who, in their
imprudent zeal of their animosity to the plan of the Convention,
have labored to envelop it in a cloud, calculated to obscure the
plainest and simplest truths."s In other words, if the people were
later confused about the limits of the powers of Congress, it
would only be because Anti-Federalist invective, by dint of repetition, had turned the necessary and proper clause into the engine of tyranny it was never meant to be.
James Iredell verged toward a similar argument when he
asked the first North Carolina ratification convention to consider
the consequences of resting the authority of constitutional rights
on the potentially incomplete enumeration of a formal declaration of rights. Iredell asked the delegates to imagine how future
rulers bent on invading some fundamental right left unmentioned
in such a declaration might reason historically about its omission.
Would they not naturally say, "We live at a great distance from
the time when this Constitution was established. We can judge
of it much better by the ideas of it entertained at the time,
than by any ideas of our own. The bill of rights, passed at that
time, showed that the people did not think every power retained which was not given. else this bill of rights was not only
useless, but absurd. "9

Later interpreters would naturally assume that their "ancestors,"
scrupulous in "their attachment to liberty," had incorporated
every right they deemed worthy of protection.w Yet even in this
effort to think of interpretation as a process of historical recov5. Federalist 33 (Hamilton) in Cooke, ed., The Federalist Papers at 204 (cited in
note 4).
6. !d. at 205.
7. Id. at 206.
8. !d. at 206-07.
9. J. Iredell, speech of July 28, 1788, in Philip B. Kurland and Ralph Lerner, eds., 1
The Founders' Constitution 475, 476 (U. of Chicago Press, 1987).
10. !d.
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ery-one generation reconstructing the purposes of anotherIredell assumed that interpreters would have no useful sources to
examine beyond the Constitution itself. Acting "long after all
traces of our present disputes were at an end," they would not
examine documentary evidence to reconstruct the debate to
which he was now contributing.n They would read the Constitution much as Federalists were reading it now, relying on its plain
language and structure to ascertain its meaning. If some rights
were enumerated and others not, they would need no other evidence to conclude that the omissions were deliberate.
For Federalists, then, the idea that later interpreters might
resort to evidence drawn from the ratification debates carried a
perverse implication. Repetition of the wild charges that AntiFederalists were directing against the Constitution might have
the effect of fulfilling its adversaries' bleak predictions that the
tyranny of consolidation and the restriction of liberty were the
true intentions of the document. By insisting that their extreme
readings of its clauses were correct, Anti-Federalists risked making the Constitution a far more dangerous document than it was
meant to be.
Anti-Federalists, by contrast, generally argued that the language of the Constitution was so malleable as to invite the openended "construction" they dreaded. In a sense, Anti-Federalists
did imagine that this process of intepretation would be faithful to
the purposes of the framers. Rather than portray the latent dangers of the Constitution as the unintended consequences of inadequate deliberation and sloppy draftsmanship, they suggested
that the "dark conclave" at Philadelphia had conspired to fasten
a charter of tyranny on their unsuspecting countrymen. And
once delegate Luther Martin began to publish his Genuine Information about the debates in the Federal Convention, Anti-Federalists had a plausible basis for thinking these suspicions well
founded.12
Nevertheless, Anti-Federalists rarely if ever implied that evidence of what was being said about the Constitution in 1787-1788
would provide later interpreters with a useful guide to its mean11. Id.
12. Philadelphiensis, no. X, Phikldelphia Freeman's Journal, Feb. 20, 1788, in John P.
Kaminski and Gaspare J. Saladino, eds., 16 Documencary History of the Ratification of the
Constitution 158, 159 (State Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1986). Luther Martin's serial
history of the Convention first appeared in the Middlesex Gazette and was reprinted as
The Genuine Information Delivered to the Legislature of the State of Maryland Relative to
the Proceedings of the General Convention Lately Held at Philadelphia (Eleazer Oswald,
1788); for convenience, it may be read most easily in Herbert J. Storing, ed., 2 The Com·
plete Ami-Federalist 19 (U. of Chicago Press, 1981).
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ing. Insofar as Anti-Federalists protested that the advocates of
the Constitution were misrepresenting its deeper intentions, they
could hardly have credited Federalist positions as accurate statements of the true meaning of the Constitution. From their point
of view, such interpretations were necessarily deceptive. Presumably their own dissents would provide better predictions of
what the Constitution really meant-though should it be
adopted, their comments must represent the skeptical views of
the non-ratifying minority, rather than the presumably more authoritative judgments of the approving majority.
In only one respect did some Anti-Federalists belatedly
stumble upon a formula that might enable their expressed concerns to serve as a possible brake on erroneous interpretations of
the Constitution. In those states where the Constitution was
hotly debated or closely contested, Anti-Federalist strategy typically wavered between merely recommending amendments to the
early consideration of the new Congress, or somehow making the
ratification by their particular state contingent upon the prior
adoption of specific amendments. Federalists struggled hard and,
on the whole, successfully, to restrict their opponents to the former alternative. But in the New York convention, the final maneuvers surrounding the act of ratification included the adoption
of two sets of amendments: one, essentially a bill of rights, offering "Explanations" of these rights "consistent with the said Constitution"; the other recommending substantive changes to the
main text. Had Anti-Federalists in other states hit upon this explanatory expedient at an earlier point, they conceivably could
have developed it into a device to convert expressions of opinion
into statements with some interpretative authority. But New
York was the eleventh state to endorse the Constitution, and its
action came too late to leave a legacy for subsequent interpreters.13
Intriguing as these scattered references may be, their very
paucity tends to confirm what Powell argues and Lofgren would
probably concede: that neither the framers nor the ratifiers had
any notion that documentary evidence of their intentions and understandings would provide intepreters with a useful guide to the
true meaning of the Constitution. The text and structure of the
13. I discuss the variety of ways in which Federalists and Anti-Federalists jockeyed
over the character of the decision the state conventions would take in Jack N. Rakove,
Original Meanings: Politics and Ideas in the Making of the Constitution 114-115 (Alfred A.
Knopf, 1996). For the text of the New York instrument of ratification, with its multiple
forms of amendments, see Linda Grant DePauw, The Eleventh Pillar: New York State and
the Federal Constitution 293-302 (Cornell U. Press, 1966).
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document would provide the locus of interpretation; historical
evidence of the debates would not be relevant.
There is no reason to think that James Madison held any
different view during the debates of 1787-1788, and good reason
to suspect that he privately believed that misrepresentation and
demagoguery were the chief currencies in which they had been
conducted. Madison did the best he could to elevate the tone of
debate in The Federalist and at the Richmond convention, but he
did not hold a high opinion of much of the polemical literature
and speech-making that ratification occasioned, or of the capacity of most citizens to form independent opinions on as complicated a subject as the Constitution.J4 In the Virginia convention,
he had to contend with the erratic tactics of his chief adversary,
Patrick Henry, whose rambling if brilliant oratory made an orderly discussion of the Constitution difficult.
Even after the Constitution was ratified, Madison feared
that "the feverish state of the public mind" had to be carefully
reduced to a more placid condition.Js He was upset when Hamilton and other New York Federalists endorsed their opponents'
call for a second general convention. "The delay of a few years
will assuage the jealousies which have been artifically created by
designing men and will at the same time point out the faults
which really call for amendment," he wrote Jefferson. "At present the public mind is neither sufficiently cool nor sufficiently informed for so delicate an operation."t6 When his friend Edmund
Randolph endorsed this idea,11 Madison replied that "an early
convention" would "be the offspring of party & passion, and will
probably for that reason alone be the parent of error and public
injury."ts The fact of ratification suggested that "a greater proportion" of the American people were content with the Constitution. "Should radical alterations take place they will not result
from the deliberate sense of the people," he concluded, "but will
be obtained by management, or extorted by menaces."t9
I4. On this point, see especially his revealing letter to E. Randolph of Jan. IO, 1788,
in Robert A. Rutland, et al., eds., 10 The Papers of James Madison 354 (U. of Chicago
Press, 1977).
15. Letter of J. Madison to T. Jefferson, Sep. 21, 1788, in Robert A. Rutland, et al.,
eds., 11 The Papers of James James Madison 257, 258 (U. Press of Virginia, 1977).
16. Letter of 1. Madison toT. Jefferson, Aug. 10, I788, in Rutland, et al., eds., 11 The
Papers of James Madison at 226 (cited in note 15).
17. See letter of E. Randolph to 1. Madison, Aug. I3, 1788, in Rutland, et al., eds., II
The Papers of James Madison at 231-32 (cited in note 15).
18. Letter of J. Madison to E. Randolph, Aug. 22, 1788, in Rutland, et al., eds., 11
The Papers of James Madison at 237 (cited in note I5).
19. Id. 'Yriti~g to Jeffe~on on August 23, I788, Madison again noted that "(a]n
early ConventiOn IS m every v1ew to be dreaded in the present temper of America. A
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These concerns were not confined to Madison's private writings, for he voiced much the same sentiments in Federalist 49 and
50. Here Madison went out of his way to discuss a proposal that
was not before the American public in 1787-1788: Jefferson's
scheme, as sketched in Notes on the State of Virginia,zo to allow
periodic or occasional appeals to the sovereign authority of the
people to remedy situations in which one branch of government
encroached on the constitutional duties of another. Madison
faulted this proposal on three grounds. First, "frequent appeals"
of this kind would "deprive the government of that veneration
which time bestows on every thing," sapping "[the] reverence for
the laws" and the useful "prejudices of the community" that even
"the most rational government" requires. Second, Americans
would not always act under the favorable circumstances that during the Revolution had "repressed the passions most unfriendly
to order and concord" and "stifled the ordinary diversity of opinions on great national questions." Constitutional "experiments
are of too ticklish a nature to be unnecessarily multiplied," especially if they risked "disturbing the public tranquillity by interesting too strongly the public passions."zt Third, and most
important, Madison feared that a public decision on a constitutional dispute
could never be expected to tum on the true merits of the question. It would inevitably be connected with the spirit of preexisting parties, or of parties springing out of the question itself. It would be connected with persons of distinguished character. and extensive influence in the community. It would be
pronounced by the very men who had been agents in, or opponents of the measures. to which the decision would relate. The
passions, therefore, not the reason. of the public, would sit in
judgment. But it is the reason of the public alone. that ought
to control and regulate the government. The passions ought
to be controlled and regulated by the Govemment.22

On constitutional questions, then, as on ordinary political issues,
Madison believed that any coherent expression of public opinion
very short period of delay would produce the double advantage of diminishing the heat
and increasing the light of all parties." 11 The Papers of James Madison at 238 (cited in
note 15).
20. For Jefferson's proposal in Notes on the State of Virginia, see the excerpt printed
in Kurland and Lerner, eds., 1 The Founders' Constitution at 639-42 (cited in note 9).
21. Federalist 49 (Hamilton) in Cooke, ed., The Federalist Papers at 340-41 (cited in
note 4).
22. Id. at 342-43.
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would nearly always flow from the volatile forces of passion and
interest that he was eager to "control."
All of these arguments were prospective: all anticipated the
role that public opinion would play in future constitutional disputes. Arguably Madison might have believed that the special
circumstances attending this original moment of constitutionmaking of 1787-1788 were operating to allow public reason to
ground its decision on "the true merits of the question." But
again, little if anything in his private writings of this period indicates that he held a more exalted opinion of the character of the
original debate on the adoption of the Constitution. To suggest
that he would have regarded the entire corpus of this public debate as a reliable and authoritative index of what the Constitution originally meant, or an evidentiary resource to which later
interpreters could confidently turn, stretches the boundaries of
plausibility.
Did Madison have a positive theory of his own to explain
how the clauses of the Constitution might be interpreted to preserve its essential equilibrium? Three principles best encapsulate
the interpretive norms to which Madison originally subscribed.
First, it is plausible to assume that his approach to constitutional
intepretation would have been cautiously conservative and even
originalist in this sense: that the aim of interpretation should be
to preserve the original boundaries between departments and jurisdictions laid out in the text of the Constitution. But, in the
second place, Madison's approach to the complementary
problems of federalism and separation of powers rested on the
recognition that these lines were not neatly or unambiguously
drawn. As he put the crucial point in Federalist 37:
Experience has instructed us that no skill in the science of
Government has yet been able to discriminate and define,
with sufficient certainty, its three great provinces, the Legislative, Executive, and Judiciary; or even the privileges and powers of the different Legislative branches. Questions daily
occur in the course of practice, which prove the obscurity that
reigns in these subjects, and which puzzle the greatest adepts
in political science.23

If that was the case, it followed that a more precise surveying of

constitutional boundaries would depend on some course of interpretation and adjustment.
23.
4).

Federalist 37 (Madison) in Cooke, ed., The Federalist Papers at 235 (cited in note
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As Madison went on to observe, "All new laws, though
penned with the greatest technical skill, and passed on the fullest
and most mature deliberation, are considered as more or less obscure and equivocal, until their meaning be liquidated and ascertained by a series of particular discussions and adjudications. "24
Because a constitution was more than a statute, "liquidating" its
meaning might require other forms of review than those customarily applied to legislation. Yet no statute adopted in America
had ever undergone "more mature" deliberation than the Constitution itself, and though Madison did not develop the point explicitly, the same maxim would surely govern its interpretation as
well. In this sense, Madison's original expectations about interpretation probably lay fairly close to H. Jefferson Powell's account: the intended meaning of the Constitution would only
become evident over time, as a course of "discussions and adjudications" set the precedents required to illuminate and clarify exactly where the boundaries and landmarks of power lay.
There was, however, a third and arguably more important
expectation about the problem of constitutional interpretation
that Madison harbored in 1787-1788, and which becomes all the
more striking when it is juxtaposed with the positions he took in
the years ahead. Madison did not believe that the most likely
sources of encroachment which interpretation would have to address and correct were evenly or symmetrically distributed
throughout the constitutional system. The danger that alarmed
him most-especially within the national realm of governmentwould emanate from the House of Representatives, the one institution where the factious passions and interests of the people
would be felt most immediately. Madison fittingly pursued this
point in the final lines he wrote as Publius. "[T]he irresistible
force possessed by that branch of a free government, which has
the people on its side," he wrote in Federalist 63, made the common Anti-Federalist prediction that the Senate might "transform
itself, by gradual usurpations, into an independent and aristocratic body" utterly frivolous. Should it ever seek to do so, "the
[H]ouse of [R]epresentatives, with the people on their side will at
all times be able to bring back the constitution to its primitive
form and principles." Not so the obverse situation. "Against the
force of the immediate representatives of the people, nothing will
be able to maintain even the constitutional authority of the
[s]enate, but such a display of enlightened policy, and attachment
to the public good, as will divide with that branch of the legisla24.

!d. at 236.
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ture, the affections and support of the entire body of the people
themselves. "zs
Nothing that transpired during the ratification debate or the
first federal elections shook this opinion. While waiting for Congress to assemble, Madison predicted that the new government
would share many of the same democratic "features" of "the
State Governments."26 When Congress conducted its first serious constitutional debate, he wrote Randolph that he favored a
sole presidential power over the removal of executive officials
because "I see, and politically feel that that will be the weak
branch of the Government."27 This concern recurs in a letter to
his mentor, Edmund Pendleton. "In truth, the Legislative power
is of such a nature that it scarcely can be restrained either by the
Constitution or by itself," Madison almost sighed. "And if the
federal Government should lose its proper equilibrium within itself, I am persuaded that the effect will proceeed from the Encroachments of the Legislative department." If the choice of
evils lay between the Senate and the President, Madison added,
there was more to fear from the upper house. But "I am fully in
the opinion," he concluded, "that the numerous and immediate
representatives of the people, composing the other House, will
decidedly predominate in the Government."zs
Over the next seven years, however, Madison had to reassess these underlying premises of his thought. His movement toward the endorsement of a form of originalism was not the
product of a speculative effort to fashion a proper model of interpretation, but a response to the events that generated the great
partisan conflicts of the 1790s: the dispute over the bank in 1791,
the outbreak of European war in 1793, and the prolonged debate
over the Jay Treaty in 1795-1796. That does not mean, however,
that Madison's reassessments were driven by politics alone, or
that his constitutional positions were purely instrumental means
to pursue political ends. For one thing, the boundary between
the political and the constitutional cannot be so tidily drawn; for
another, it would be an error to assume that agreement upon
norms and procedures of constitutional interpretation accompa25. Federalist 63 (Hamilton) in Cooke, ed., The Federalist Papers at 430·31 (cited in
note 4).
26. Letter of J. Madison toT. Jefferson, Mar. 29, 1789, in Charles F. Hobson, et al.,
eds., 12 The Papers of James Madison 37, 38 (U. Press of Virginia, 1979).
27. Letter of J. Madison to E. Randolph, May 31, 1789, in Hobson, et al., eds., 12
The Papers of James Madison at 190 (cited in note 26).
28. Letter of J. Madison to E. Pendleton, June 21, 1789, in Hobson, et al., eds., 12
The Papers of James Madison at 253 (cited in note 26).
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nied the adoption of the Constitution in 1788. It may well have
been that the inclination to read the Constitution as a statute or
contract might be read was the most natural course that Americans could follow after 1789; but that did not preclude the emergence of other norms of interpretation as Americans worked out
the implications of treating popularly ratified constitutions as
supreme law.
One incident from the well-known House debate of June
1789 over the removal power of the president does suggest that
recourse to the documentary evidence relating to the adoption of
the Constitution was not part of the interpretative quiver from
which its first interpreters could readily draw.z9 One pole in this
debate was occupied by William L. Smith of South Carolina, who
argued that the president had no discretionary authority to remove subordinate officials, that impeachment was the only constitutionally recognized mode of removal, and that this entire
issue was probably best left to judicial resolution the first time a
displaced official sued to retain his position. After failing to
prove that removal required impeachment, Smith insisted that
the consent of the Senate was constitutionally required to remove as well as appoint.3o This opinion was supported by "[a]
publication of no inconsiderable eminence, in the class of political writings on the constitution," Smith told the House on June
16. He then read a passage from Federalist 77 affirming that
"[t]he consent of [the Senate] would be necessary to displace as
well as appoint. "31 But a rude shock awaited Smith. As he wrote
Edward Rutledge shortly thereafter:
the next day [Egbert] Benson [of New York] sent me a note
across the house to this effect: that Pub/ius had informed him
since the preceding day's debate, that upon mature reflection
he had changed his opinion & was now convinced that the
President alone should have the power of removal at pleasure;
He is a Candidate for the office of Secretary of Finance!32
29. For the initial debate on this issue, see Charlene Bangs Bickford, et al., eds., 10
Documentary History of the First Federal Congress of the United States of America 718
(John Hopkins U. Press, 1992) (recalling the debate of May 19, 1789) and Charlene Banks
Bickford, et al., 11 Documentary History of the First Federal Congress ofthe United States
of America 842-1036 (John Hopkins U. Press, 1992) (continuing the debate from June 1622, 1789). For analysis of the issues in this debate, see Donald G. Morgan, Congress and
the Constitution: A Study of Responsibility 49-57 (Belknap Press, 1966).
30. W. L. Smith, speech of June 16, 1789, in Bickford, et al., eds., 11 Documentary
History at 860, 861-64 (cited in note 29).
31. Id. at 861.
32. Letter of W. Smith to E. Rutledge, June 21, 1789, in 69 South Carolina Historical
Magazine 6, 8 (South Carolina Historical Society, 1968).

1996]

ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING

171

The candidate was, of course, Hamilton; and Smith may well
have known that Madison was the other of the "two gentlemen
of great information" who had written as "Publius."33
As an exercise in interpretation, the removal debate followed the prevailing rules of construction that emphasized the
manifest language of the text, internal consistency, and fidelity to
general principles. Congressmen disagreed not about these rules
per se, but rather about matters of definition and the weight to
be given to specific passages and principles.
As interesting as the removal debate may be to scholars as
the first example of constitutional interpretation under the new
government, it was, of course, the debate of 1791 over the bill to
charter a national bank that first opened the great fissure that
widened every year thereafter-and which arguably resonates
still.34 Curiously, neither Powell nor Lofgren pays any attention
to the arguments Madison advanced in opposing the bank during
the debate in the House; Powell instead examines the rival opinions of secretaries Hamilton and Jefferson,3s while Lofgren looks
ahead to Madison's reasoning on the process whereby precedent
and popular acceptance made acceptable what was originally dubious.36 In fact, in the hunt for the origins of originalism,
Madison's major speech of February 2, 1791, is noteworthy for
several reasons.
First, Madison clearly indicated that his knowledge of the
deliberations at the Federal Convention, and thus of the framers'
intentions, was a material factor informing his constitutional objections to the bank. His reservations were "the stronger, because he well recollected that a power to grant charters of
incorporation had been proposed in the general convention and
rejected."37 That proposal was in fact his own, numbered among
a list of "proper" powers referred to the committee of detail on
August 18, 1787. When no such power was reported, Madison
renewed his motion (on September 14) to authorize Congress "to
grant charters of incorporation where the interest of the U. S.
might require & the legislative provisions of individual States
33. W. L. Smith, speech of June 16, 1789. in Bickford, et al., eds., 11 Documentary
History at 861 (cited in note 29).
34. For the debate as a whole, see Benjamin B. Klubes, The First Federal Congress
and the First National Bank: A Case Study in Constitutional Interpretation, 10 J. of the
Early Republic 19 (1990); and Stanley Elkins and Eric McKitrick, The Age of Federalism
223-34 (Oxford U. Press, 1993).
35. Rakove, ed., Interpreting the Constitution at 69-70 (cited in note 1).
36. Id. at 139-40.
37. J. Madison, speech of Feb. 2, 1791, in Charles F. Hobson, et al., eds., 13 The
Papers of James Madison 372, 374 (U. Press of Virginia, 1984).
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may be incompetent." Rufus King and James Wilson clearly
thought this proposal embraced banks, for they disagreed
whether its approval would damage the prospects for ratification
by exciting the financial rivalries of Philadelphia and New York.
The proposal was abandoned after the delegates rejected a test
vote on a "modified" motion "limited to the case of canals."
Nothing in Madison's notes indicates that the motion was
thought superfluous because the necessary-and-proper clause already reached the power in question. That is, his very purpose in
proposing the power in question presumed that without such explicit authority, the new Congress could not readily issue charters
of incorporation. On the other hand, just as Wilson thought that
a power to create "mercantile monopolies" was "already included in the power to regulate trade," so other framers may
have reasoned that a power to charter banks could derive from
other clauses.3s
Madison did not claim that this tidbit of history was conclusive in itself; he merely sought to demonstrate that his scruples
were not contrived for the moment.39 Instead, as "preliminaries
to a right interpretation," he proceeded to offer several "rules."
The first two argued that when the "meaning" of a provision was
"doubtful, it is fairly triable by its consequences," especially
when "the very characteristic of the government" might be
threatened. Madison's next two rules laid the groundwork for an
originalist method of construction:
In controverted cases, the meaning of the parties to the
instrument. if to be collected by reasonable evidence, is a
proper guide.
38. Debate of Sept. 14, 1787, in Max Farrand, ed., 2 The Records of the Federal
Convention of 1787 at 325, 615-16 (Yale U. Press, rev. ed., 1966) ("Records"). In 1798,
Abraham Baldwin recounted to Jefferson a conversation he had had with Wilson when
the bank bill was under discussion, in which Baldwin recalled and Wilson agreed that
Robert Morris had moved in Convention to give Congress a specific power to incorporate
banks, but Gouverneur Morris had opposed the idea with the political arguments that
Madison's notes ascribe to King. Farrand, ed., 3 Records at 375.
39. It is noteworthy, too, that Madison had reasoned similarly about the Constitution a year earlier, when Tench Coxe proposed a scheme to set aside national lands as a
fund to lure European inventors to bring their machinery to America. Letter ofT. Coxe
to J. Madison, Mar. 21, 1790, in Hobson, et al., eds., 13 The Papers of James Madison at
112-13 (cited in note 37). Though Madison had proposed an appropriate provision at the
Convention, it had been whittled down to the sole incentives of limited patents and copyrights. "This fetter on the National Legislature tho' an unfortunate one, was a deliberate
one," Madison concluded. "The Latitude of authority now wished for was strongly urged
and expressly rejected." Letter of J. Madison toT. Coxe, Mar. 30, 1790, in Hobson, et al.,
eds., 13 The Papers of James Madison at 128 (cited in note 37).
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Contemporary and concurrent expositions are a reasonable evidence of the meaning of the parties.40

Here, then, a second and more important originalist implication
of Madison's speech leaps into view (though overlooked by Powell and Lofgren): Madison was already prepared to suggest that
historical evidence drawn from the ratification debates did provide a legitimate, relevant basis for interpretation. Ignoring The
Federalist, which offered little support for his position, Madison
looked elsewhere, reading passages from the debates in the
Pennsylvania, Virginia, and North Carolina conventions to affirm
that Federalists had repeatedly argued "that the powers not
given" to the national government "were retained; and that those
given were not to be extended by remote implications"; and further, "that the terms necessary and proper gave no additional
powers to those enumerated." Madison did not describe these
opinions as anything more than expositions; they only confirmed
arguments that could be advanced on more familiar grounds.
But the germ of an intepretive theory of original understanding
was nonetheless present.4I
That this theory was something of a novelty seems to be corroborated by the thorough rebuke it elicited from Elbridge
Gerry, the non-signing framer of the Constitution who later became Madison's vice-president. Dismissing Madison's rules as
"being made for the occasion," Gerry invoked the "sanctioned"
authority of Blackstone to propose that the House follow more
settled rules. "[T]he fairest and most rational method to interpret the will of the legislator," Blackstone had written, "is, by
exploring his intention at the time when the law was made, by
signs the most natural and probable; and these signs are either
the words, the context, the subject matter, the effect and consequences, or the spirit and reason of the law."42 Gerry did not
identify the "legislator" whose "will" and "intention" he was analyzing, but he offered telling objections that grasped the problem of recovering a coherent collective intention by aggregating
individual opinions. As for Madison's appeal to the Federal
Convention, Gerry asked,

40. J. Madison, speech of Feb. 2, 1791, in Hobson, et al., eds., 13 Papers of James
Madison at 374 (cited in note 37).
41. ld. at 380.
42. E. Gerry, speech of Feb. 7, 1791, in M. St. Clarke and D.A. Hall, eds., Legislative
and Documentary History of the Bank of the United States 75-81 (Augustus M. Kelley,
reprint ed., 1967).
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are we to depend on the memory of the gentleman for an history of their debates, and from thence to collect their sense?
This would be improper, because the memories of different
gentlemen would probably vary, as they have already done,
with respect to those facts; and. if not, the opinions of the individual members, who debated, are not to be considered as the
opinions of the convention.43

Gerry then demonstrated the fallibility of his own memory by
wrongly claiming that the proposition the Convention had entertained was one "to erect commercial corporations." But his objection grew stronger when he turned to Madison's use of the
ratification conventions. It was well known that these records
were "partial and mutilated," Gerry noted. Even if that bias was
discounted, the speech "of one member" could not be taken "as
expressing the sense of a convention." Finally, Gerry recalled
how the urgency of the ratification proceedings led both "parties
to depart from candor, and to call in the aid of art, flattery, professions of friendship" and other doubtful tactics. "Under such
circumstances," he concluded, "the opinions of great men ought
not to be considered as authorities, and, in many instances, could
not be recognised by themselves. "44
Madison did not answer these points in his second speech of
February 8-except to marvel at how far Gerry had come since
1787. "[T]he powers of the constitution were then dark, inexplicable and dangerous," Madison observed, recalling Gerry's objections to the Constitution, "but now, perhaps as the result of
experience they are clear and luminous!"4s After Congress approved the bank bill, the President asked Attorney General Randolph, Jefferson, and Hamilton to brief the issue. Only Jefferson
followed Madison's lead in looking to the evidence of 1787-1788,
and he did so merely to note that the Convention had rejected
the power in question. But Randolph, while also opposing the
bill, thought that neither the "almost unknown history" of the
Convention nor opinions given during ratification could be regarded.46 Hamilton refuted the argument even more vigorously.
"[N]o inference whatever can be drawn" from the unauthenti43. ld. at 79.
44. ld. at 80.
45. J. Madison, speech of Feb. 8, 1791, in Hobson, et al., eds., 13 Papers of James
Madison at 385 (cited in note 37). Madison was, of course, referring to Gerry's objections
to the Constitution. Gerry had been one of the three delegates to the Convention who
had declined to sign the completed Constitution (along with Madison's Virginia colleagues, George Mason and Edmund Randolph).
46. Opinion of E. Randolph, Feb. 12, 1791, in Clark and Hall, eds., Legislative and
Documentary History at 90 (cited in note 42).
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cated and "very different accounts" that might be given of the
Convention's action. Hamilton concluded this discussion by restating the familiar rule of interpretation. 47 Jefferson could "not
deny, that, whatever may have been the intentions of the framers
of a constitution, or of a law, that intention is to be sought for in
the instrument itself, according to the usual and established rules
of construction."4s Washington signed the bill.
Hamilton's opinion and Gerry's speech certainly confirm, as
Powell argues, that the prevailing rules of interpretation did not
yet permit the recourse to historical evidence that a sound theory
of originalism would require. Even for Madison, arguments
drawn from the text and structure of the Constitution seemed to
weigh more heavily in his opposition to the bank than did his
corroboratory appeals to the intentions and understandings of
1787-1788. Yet his use of historical evidence indicates that as
early as 1791 he was prepared to argue that the understandings
of the ratifiers could erect a legitimate fence around the limits of
construction. Nor was Madison's originalism wholly contrived to
meet expedient political needs. He would not have proposed adding a power to grant charters of incorporation to Article I had
he believed that the necessary and proper clause would work to
the same effect. More important, his criticism of an open-ended
interpretation of this clause, however dubious it appears to scholarly commentators, was clearly consistent with the critique of legislation on which his constitutional theory rested. The great
problem of republicanism was to develop constitutional mechanisms and political understandings to limit the plasticity of legislative power and the irresistible force of public opinion behind
it.49 Licensing Congress to make its discretion the test of its authority was the last precedent Madison wished to set while the
process of ascertaining the meaning of the Constitution was still
far from complete.
This fundamental premise of Madison's theory became increasingly problematic, however, after 1791, when foreign affairs
overtook domestic policy as the chief source of partisan conflict.
The imperatives of diplomacy placed a premium on the energy
and dispatch the framers had envisioned for the presidency; they
also gave the administration a political initiative to which the opposition Republicans in Congress could only react. The constitu47. Opinion of A. Hamilton. Feb. 23, 1791, in Clark and Hall, eds., Legislative and
Documentary History at 101 (cited in note 42).
48. Id.
49. For further commentary on this point, see Rakove, Original Meanings at 46-54,
310-16, 330-36 (cited in note 13).
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tional implications of this dispute were first laid out in a famous
exchange between Hamilton (writing as "Pacificus") and
Madison (writing as "Helvidius"). Defending the administration's April 1793 decision to issue a proclamation of neutrality
without consulting Congress, then in recess, Hamilton argued
that the conduct of foreign relations was inherently executive in
nature, except in those cases (treaties, diplomatic appointments,
declarations of war) where the Constitution explicitly dictated
otherwise.5o
Madison replied that this improper view of executive power
seemed to derive from two sources. One was the ideas of such
authorities as Locke and Montesquieu, whose views were "evidently warped" by their admiration for the British constitution.5I
The other was the model of executive prerogative that British
theory and practice placed in the crown. In preference to these
sources, Madison concluded, one need only read the works of a
recent American writer: Hamilton himself-or rather Publius,
though the authors of The Federalist were now publicly known.
Drawing on Federalist 69 and 75, Madison quoted passages which
contradicted the claims of "Pacificus," noting that they were
"made at a time when no application to persons or measures
could bias: The opinion given was not transiently mentioned, but
formally and critically elucidated: It related to a point in the constitution which must consequently have been viewed as of importance in the public mind. "52 Had the Federalists of 1788 been
privy to the analysis of "Pacificus," Madison concluded, they
could only have thought it " 'an experiment on public
credulity.' "53
Madison's recourse to The Federalist was made largely for
rhetorical effect; he did not suggest that "Pacificus" was wrong
because he contradicted Publius, only that these essays exposed
the fallacy in Hamilton's reasoning. Originalism itself was not at
stake in 1793. But it did become a serious question in 1795-1796,
after the Senate narrowly approved the controversial treaty that
Chief Justice John Jay brought back from Britain. Only then was
the treaty published, eliciting a storm of protest that alarmed
50. See Letter of "Pacificus," No. I, June 29, 1793, in Harold C. Syrett and Jacob E.
Cooke, eds., 15 The Papers of Alexander Hamilton 33-43 (Columbia U. Press, 1969).
51. Letter of "Helvidius," No.1, Aug. 24, 1793, in Thomas A. Mason, et al., eds., 15
The Papers of James Madison 68 (U. Press of Virginia, 1985).
52. ld. at 72.
53. Letter of "Helvidius," No.3, Sep. 7, 1793, in Mason, et al., eds., 15 The Papers of
James Madison at 97 (cited in note 51). This last uncredited quotation carne from Federalist 24, as only Madison and (perhaps) its author, Hamilton, were likely to know.
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Washington but failed to deter his ratification of the treaty in
August 1795. Barred from blocking the treaty politically, the Republican opposition fashioned constitutional barriers to its implementation, hoping to capitalize on their majority in the House
when the Fourth Congress convened in December.
Treaty opponents made three claims on behalf of the constitutional authority of the House in treaty-making. Should not a
treaty which affected foreign trade require the approval of the
House (which shared the congressional power to regulate commerce)? If public funds had to be expended to implement the
treaty, should the House not judge those appropriations on their
merits? And how could it exercise this traditional power without
considering the treaty proper, which might in turn justify examining other records relating to its negotiation?54 Though Madison
was reluctant to take this ground, he was also the principal author of a widely reprinted petition to the Virginia assembly
whose fourth major complaint held that "The President and Senate by ratifying this Treaty, usurp the powers of regulating commerce, of making rules with respect to aliens, of establishing
tribunals of justice, and of defining piracy" -all powers of
Congress.ss
The burden of defending the treaty fell largely to Hamilton,
now retired to his legal practice. In thirty-eight numbers of "The
Defence," Hamilton and Rufus King justified the Jay Treaty
largely on its merits, reaching the constitutional questions only in
the final three essays published just after the new year. In the
first of these essays, Hamilton argued that the plain text of the
supremacy clause bound the House no less than the states to adhere to duly ratified treaties.s6 The next essay argued that the
claims made for the House would render the formal treaty power
of the President and Senate "altogether nominal,"s7 thereby vio54. For an introduction to the constitutional questions, see Abraham D. Sofaer,
War, Foreign Affairs and Constitutional Power: The Origins 85-93 (Ballinger Publishing
Co., 1976), and the fascinating article by Ruth Wedgwood, The Revolutionary Martyrdom
of Jonathan Robbins, 100 Yale L.J. 229, 260-68 (1990).
55. Petition to General Assembly by J. Madison, Oct. 12, 1795, in Stagg, ed., 16 The
Papers of James Madison at 102 (cited in note 3). This point does not appear in the draft
version of this petition which the editors of The Papers of James Madison have recently
identified, and it is possible its addition came at the urging of Jefferson, whom the Madisons visited only days before the petition was first printed. Draft of Petition to the General Assembly by J. Madison, Sep. 1795, in Stagg, ed., 16 The Papers of James Madison 6269 (cited in note 3).
56. See "The Defence No. XXXVI," Jan. 2, 1796, in Harold C. Syrett, ed., 20 The
Papers of Alexander Hamilton 3 (Columbia U. Press, 1974).
57. "The Defence No. XXXVII," Jan. 6, 1796, in Syrett, ed., 20 The Papers of Alexander Hamilton at 13 (cited in note 56).
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lating the rule of construction which required "that every instrument is so to be interpreted, that all the parts may if possible
consist with each other. "ss If the claims made for the House
were allowed, pretexts could always be found to assert that a
treaty trenched upon some aspect of legislation, thereby emptying the language of the treaty clause of any meaning.s9
The last essay was addressed to Madison. Here Hamilton
asked how the treaty power "was understood by the Convention,
in framing it, and by the people in adopting it." No "formal
proof of the opinions" of the framers existed, Hamilton conceded. "But from the best opportunity of knowing the fact"thus intimating that the author of "The Defence" was himself a
framer-it was evident that they thought the treaty power was
comprehensive in its reach.60 For the truth of this claim he appealed to the two former framers-Madison and Abraham Baldwin-expected to "obstruct ... execution" of the Jay Treaty in
the House. Hamilton then cited George Mason's and Gerry's
objections to the Constitution as proof that the treaty power
vested "an exclusive power of legislation" in the President and
Senate.6t Nor was this an Anti-Federalist opinion alone, for in a
lengthy footnote, Hamilton quoted two of Madison's essays in
The Federalist to confirm that Federalists had argued that the
joint role of the President and Senate left the treaty power "sufficiently guarded."62 Where "Publius" was concerned, turn-about
was fair play.
In March, Washington asked the House to appropriate funds
to implement the treaty. Republicans then introduced a resolution asking the President to provide the executive papers that
would enable the House to view the treaty in its proper light.
Federalists answered this request by applying the conventional
norms of legal construction. "Are we to explain the Treaty by
private and confidential papers, or by any thing extraneous to the
instrument itself?" asked Daniel Buck of Vermont. 63 A challenge to a treaty "should be determined from the face of the instrument," William L. Smith argued; "a knowledge of the
preparatory steps which led to its adoption, could throw no light
58. ld. at 19.
59. See id. generally.
60. "The Defence No. XXXVIII," Jan. 9, 1796, in Syrett, ed., 20 The Papers of Alexander Hamilton at 22 (cited in note 56).
61. ld. at 22-23.
62. Id. at 24 and n. *.
63. W. Seaton and J. Gales, Jr., eds., 4th Cong., 1st Sess. Debates and Proceedings in
the Congress of the United States 432 (Gales and Seaton, 1834-1856) ("Annals of
Congress").
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upon it." The President would not "examine the Journals of the
House" to test the constitutionality of a law, Smith added, nor
would the Supreme Court do so in its imminent decision determining whether the federal carriage tax should be classed as a
direct tax to be apportioned according to the three-fifths rule
(the first case in which the Court clearly tested the constitutionality of a congressional statute ).64
When the Republicans persisted, however, the focus of debate shifted from the treaty to the Constitution. Though
Madison had misgivings about this strategy, he joined the fray in
a lengthy speech on March 10, 1796. His argument rested on text
and inference alone, not history. If Federalist arguments were
given full force, he asserted, the House would be obliged to forfeit its "deliberation & discretion" and to support indefinitely a
war triggered by a treaty of alliance framed by the President and
Senate alone. regardless of its power over war, armies, and appropriations. Acknowledging some role for the House was the
only way to give "signification to every part of the Constitution,"
even if the designated holders of the treaty power had to cope
with the difficulties created.6s
The immediate response to Madison's delayed entrance into
the debate came from Smith, well known as Hamilton's spokesman. Smith "appeal[ed] to the general sense of the whole nation
at the time the Constitution was formed," noting that through
these "contemporaneous expositions," formed "when the subject
was viewed only in relation to the abstract power, and not to a
particular Treaty, we should come at the truth." Madison had
made the same claim for The Federalist in his "Helvidius" letters,
but Smith went one step further. Had the Virginia convention in
which Madison served thought that the legislative authority of
the House could check the treaty power, it would not have proposed an amendment to require commercial treaties to be ratified by two-thirds of all senators (rather than a quorum).66
Theodore Sedgwick also made Madison his target. Did not
Madison's "known caution and prudence" oblige him to explain,
Sedgwick wondered, how the Federal Convention could have neglected to express the "true meaning" he had so belatedly discovered? Madison and other framers "certainly knew what they had
so recently intended" at Philadelphia when they defended the
64.
65.
Madison
66.

Gales and Seaton, eds., Annals of Congress at 439-40 (cited in note 63).
See J. Madison, speech of Mar. 10, 1796, in Stagg, ed., 16 The Papers of James
at 255-63 (cited in note 3).
Gales and Seaton, eds., Annals of Congress at 495 (cited in note 63).
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treaty power in the state conventions. But they had never answered objections to the treaty clause with the theory Madison
now maintained; they had instead argued that the power was well
secured by the mutual check of the President and Senate. And
responding to a complaint that Smith "had not quoted any part
of the proceedings on the subject, or of the reasons that led to
the amendment," Sedgwick read at length from the Virginia
records, citing speakers on both sides to recreate the structure of
its debate.67
Sedgwick thus implied that the intentions of the framers
were relevant, and one other major Federalist speech developed
the point further. It was well known that the politics of the Convention revolved around the compromise between small and
large states over the Senate, Benjamin Bourne of Rhode Island
reminded the House. That, too, indicated that the House did not
possess the authority claimed. But Bourne also relied on
speeches in the ratification conventions to make his point; he
agreed, with Sedgwick, that "the real inquiry was, what opinion
was entertained on this subject by those who ratified the Constitution."6s That was the question which engaged the other speakers who examined the evidence of 1787-1788. In this inquiry,
both Federalists and Republicans suggested that the ratifiers and,
beyond them, the American people had in some sense consented
to the particular interpretation each side was now advancing.
"The people have declared that the President and Senate shall
make Treaties, without a single exception," Isaac Smith observed, "and, lest there should be any mistake or cavilling about
it, they have put it in written words, as they thought, too plain to
be doubted, too positive to be contradicted."69 On the other
side, Republicans argued that the Constitution itself might never
have been ratified had the people realized that the President and
Senate would possess this "uncontrollable power."7o Several
speakers asked whose original understandings were to be treated
as more authoritative, the majority's or the minority's? William
Findley, the leading Pennsylvania Anti-Federalist now turned
Republican, even found himself ironically reflecting that he did
67. Gales and Seaton, eds., Annals of Congress at 519-20, 522-27 (cited in note 63);
the complaint that no recourse had been made to the actual debates came from William
Branch Giles, a leading Republican from Virginia. ld. at 502-03.
68. For Sedgwick's quotation, see Gales and Seaton, eds., Annals of Congress at
526-27 (cited in note 63). For Bourne's comments see id. at 567.
69. Gales and Seaton, eds., Annals of Congress at 627 (Smith) (cited in note 63).
See also id. at 516 (expressing similar views).
70. Gales and Seaton, eds., Annals of Congress, at 543-46 (Holland) (cited in note
63). See also id. at 635 (stating similar views by Livingston).
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not "expect the sentiments of a minority, acting under peculiar
circumstances of irritation, and consisting of but about one-fifth
of the members [at Harrisburg], to be quoted as a good authority
for the true sense of the Constitution." 71
From these remarks, it seems apparent that the House was
prepared to entertain interpretations reconstructing the positions
of framers, ratifiers, and "the people." The ensuing disagreements prompted a few representatives, on both sides, to suggest
that recourse to historical evidence was futile. Edward Livingston, the author of the original motion seeking the treaty papers,
even declared that "we were now as capable at least of determining the true meaning of that instrument as the Conventions were;
they were called in haste, they were heated by party, and many
adopted it from expediency, without having fully debated the different articles."n But that did not stop him from undertaking his
own originalist analysis, nor did it recall the House to traditional
rules of construction. In these exchanges, Federalists gained the
upper hand, leading Republicans to rely on the analogical reasoning to the British constitution that Madison had spurned in
"Helvidius." If the British king submitted treaties to Parliament
when they required further legal action, they reasoned, did it not
follow that the American House retained at least equal authority? Federalists dismissed this reasoning in the same terms that
Madison had condemned "Pacificus" in 1793. "[T]he practice
and prerogatives of that despotic Court" were irrelevant, Daniel
Buck exclaimed. "What have they to do with a Constitution,
which is the express will of the great body of the people of
America, prescribing rules for her own self-government?"73
Notwithstanding the problems they faced in rebutting such
blunt remarks, the Republican majority approved the call for the
treaty papers. In his short but cogent reply, Washington made
little use of the extended memorandum that he had solicited
from Hamilton-with the exception of one point. Hamilton had
reminded Washington that the Convention had "overruled" a
motion to involve the House in treatymaking, and the President
made this the concluding point of his reply. If one consulted the
71. Gales and Seaton, eds., Annals of Congress at 591-92 (Findley) (cited in note
63). See also id. at 578-80 (stating remedies by Brent).
72. Gales and Seaton, eds., Annals of Congress, at 635 (Livingston). See also id. at
647 (stating the views of Milledge, a Republican, citing the necessary and proper clause to
uphold the authority of the House!), 657-58 (citing Coit, a Federalist, then proceeding to
reflect on conduct of Baldwin and Madison).
73. Gales and Seaton, eds., Annals of Congress at 703-10 (quotations at 709-10)
(cited in note 63). This analogy had been made frequently since the start of the debate,
especially by the rising Republican star, Albert Gallatin. See id. at 464.
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Convention journal, which Washington (its custodian) had since
deposited in the Department of State, "it will appear" that a motion to require treaties to be "ratified by a Law" had been "explicitly rejected."74 Had Hamilton been present at Philadelphia
when Gouverneur Morris made this motion on August 23, 1787,
he might also have reminded Washington that Madison had first
"suggested the inconvenience of requiring a legal ratification of
treaties of alliance for purposes of war," then wondered whether
the Convention should distinguish types of treaties which might
or might not require "the concurrence of the whole Legislature. "7s If that evidence implied that the exclusion of the House
from treatymaking troubled Madison in 1787, it also confirmed
the crucial point of how the Constitution as written, was to be
interpreted now-for, of course, no such distinction had been
made.
When the House continued to pursue the issue after learning
of the President's refusal, Madison felt compelled to reenter a
debate he had worriedly observed since early March. His speech
of April6, 1796, offers perhaps the clearest (and most frequently
cited) statement of his acceptance of a version of originalism. It
was framed partly in response to Washington's appeal to the
journal of the Convention, which Madison now judged improper
even though he had reasoned much the same way in 1791. But
Madison had also been stung by the criticism he had personally
suffered when William Vans Murray, a young congressman from
Maryland, appealed directly to him during a lengthy speech of
March 23. In what must have been a dramatic moment, Murray
first praised Madison as the man to whose "genius and patriotism, in a great degree, he had always understood, were we indebted for the Constitution." But he then urged Madison to
rescue the House from its confusion.
If the Convention spoke mysterious phrases, and the gentleman helped to utter them, will not the gentleman aid the
expounding of the mystery? If the gentleman was the Pythia
in the temple, ought he not to explain the ambiguous language
of the oracle? To no man's exposition would he listen with
more deference.
74. For the Republican approval of the call for the treaty papers, see letter of A.
Hamilton to G. Washington, Mar. 29, 1796, in Syrett, ed., 20 The Papers of Alexander
Hamilton 85, 100. For Washington's reply, see letter of G. Washington to A. Hamilton,
Mar. 31, 1796, in Syrett, ed., 20 The Papers of Alexander Hamilton, 103 (cited in note 56).
75. Farrand, ed., 2 Records at 392-94 (cited in note 38). Hamilton was away in New
York at the time.
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Yet Murray could not have disguised the mocking taunt that
lurked beneath the praise, the implication that Madison had said
little because the evidence did not sustain his position.
Nor did Murray halt there. In language that carried
Madison back to his researches of 1787, Murray noted that "the
historian and the commentator" who studies other constitutions
have "to resort to records unintelligible" or "to the uncertain
lights of mere tradition." But Americans no longer had to settle
for this obscurity. They had known "the Constitution from its
cradle" and "its infancy," better than any other society had ever
known its constitution. But if the perplexing "doubts" the House
now faced could be raised "upon some of its plainest passages,"
what hope was there that posterity would maintain the boundaries of power?
One hundred years hence, should a great question arise upon
the construction, what would not be the value of that man's
intelligence, who. allowed to possess integrity and a profound
and unimpaired mind, should appear in the awful moments of
doubt, and, being known to have been in the illustrious body
that framed the instrument, should clear up difficulties by his
contemporaneous knowledge? Such a man would have twice
proved a blessing to his country.

Again, the younger man's homage could not conceal a hint of
mockery.76
Madison answered both Murray and the President on April
6. His speech was less an affirmation of the possibilities of using
the understandings of the ratifiers to fix the meaning of the Constitution than an attempt to nullify any appeal to the authority
and intentions of the framers. Madison disclaimed having either
the resources or the obligation to speak for "the intention of the
whole body" of the Convention. That would be a matter of some
"delicacy," because the framers had disagreed in their opinions
(though some, he added, supported his current position). Moreover, he had a personal reason to avoid this mode of argument,
for had he not been roundly criticized when he "incidentally" referred to the Convention during the bank debate of 1791? Nor
had any other dispute yet been settled this way. And then
Madison reached the critical transition:
But, after all, whatever veneration might be entertained
for the body of men who formed our constitution, the sense of
that body could never be regarded as the oracular guide in the
76.

Gales and Seaton, eds., Annals of Congress at 700-02 (cited in note 63).
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expounding the constitution. As the instrument came from
them. it was nothing more than the draught of a plan, nothing
but a dead letter, until life and validity were breathed into it,
by the voice of the people, speaking through the several state
conventions. If we were to look therefore, for the meaning of
the instrument, beyond the face of the instrument, we must
look for it not in the general convention, which proposed, but
in the state conventions, which accepted and ratified the
constitution.
This conclusion was entirely consistent with the great political
and theoretical insight that had enabled Madison to persuade the
Convention to follow his agenda. But as he then applied the evidence of ratification to the issue at hand, his qualified conclusions revealed more of the limitations attending this mode of
interpretation than the blinding light it would shed on the true
meaning of the Constitution.77
Again ignoring The Federalist, Madison limited his analysis
to two categories of evidence. As to the first category-the published record of the conventions (Pennsylvania, Virginia, and
North Carolina) where the treaty power was debated seriouslyhe had little to say. While noting that the speakers had regarded
the treaty power as "limited" in nature, Madison ignored the
Federalist objection that this limitation inhered in the division
between President and Senate. Instead he pursued the analogy
to the British constitution, which he weakly corroborated with an
irrelevant allusion to the pardoning power. Madison concluded
this part of the argument by conceding that even the Virginia
debates, as published, "contained internal evidences in abundance of chasms, and misconceptions of what was said. "78
The second category-the amendments proposed by the
state conventions-were a "better authority," but not free of liabilities. No one could "expect a perfect precision and system" in
these measures, given "the agitations of the public mind on that
occasion, with the hurry and compromise which generally prevailed in settling the amendments to be proposed. "79 Madison
nonetheless plunged ahead to consider the amendments as they
related to the allocation of the treaty power. Here, again, his
argument did little more than speculate that the framers of those
amendments would have favored the construction now advanced
by the Republican majority. Madison then considered two other
77. J. Madison, speech of Apr. 6, 1796, in Stagg, ed., 16 The Papers of James
Madison at 294-96 (cited in note 3).

78.
79.

ld. at 296.
Id. at 297.
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classes of amendments: those which had denied that laws could
be suspended without the assent of the legislature, and those to
require supermajorities for legislation relating to war, commerce,
and appropriations. He concluded this analysis with another
speculative question. Could the authors of these amendments,
all of which touched upon powers whose exercise could be constrained by the treaty power, have supposed that they had given
the President and Senate "an absolute and unlimited power" free
of any control by the House?so
At no point did Madison explain how proposals designed to
remedy perceived defects in the Constitution-proposals that he
himself had ignored in compiling his amendments of 1789, and
which went unadopted-could prevail over the explicit language
of the treaty clause. He never explained how criticisms of the
Constitution could be transformed into interpretations of its
meaning, when the opposite inference was more logical. Nor did
he explain how partial and hasty expressions of opinion in individual states could trump the contrary position that Federalists
occupied in this debate when they treated the language of the
Constitution as an expression of the "intention" of a sovereign
people. At only one point did Madison briefly stumble upon an
answer to these seemingly fatal objections, when he described an
amendment to the treaty power proposed by North Carolina as
"intended to ascertain, rather than to alter the meaning of the
constitution."sl But developing this point would only have exposed his position to another powerful objection. How could an
unadopted amendment proposed by a state rejoining the union
after the Constitution had taken effect be regarded as
authoritative?
When this prospect was raised in 1788, Madison vehemently
denied that states might ratify the Constitution conditionally in
the expectation that specific amendments would be adopted
later. Where else could such a process end except in a second
general convention whose prospects for success must be far
worse than that of the meeting at Philadelphia?82 Madison could
hardly have drafted his speech of April 6 without recalling this
concern; the manifest problems he now encountered in articulat80. ld. at 297-99.
81. ld. at 298.
82. For example, see Letter of J. Madison to E. Randolph, Apr. 10, I788, in Rutland, et al., eds., 11 The Papers of James Madison at 18-19 (cited in note 15); Letter of J.
Madison to A. Hamilton, July 20, I788, in Rutland, et al., eds., II The Papers of James
Madison at 189 (cited in note 15); and Letter of J. Madison toT. Jefferson, Aug. 11, 1788,
in Rutland, et al., eds., 11 The Papers of James Madison at 225-26 (cited in note 15).
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ing his ideas may have been a mark of the intellectual embarrassment he felt.
If this was originalism, then, Madison was not yet prepared
to make the most of it. His best known statement of the theory
was marred by unresolved problems. Whatever clarity he gained
by distinguishing framers from ratifiers was clouded by the difficulty of using the ambiguous debates and failed amendments of
1787-1788 to offset an express constitutional provision. After
balking at using these sources in his first speech on the Jay
Treaty, he was later driven to invoke their authority less by his
belief that they provided a viable method of interpretation than
by the arguments of other speakers, the President's message, and
Murray's pointed appeal. In this debate, the more successful
originalists were the Federalists whom Madison elsewhere accused of using the loose canon of Hamiltonian construction to
enlarge the meaning of the Constitution. When Smith, Sedgwick,
Bourne, and Murray appealed to the evidence of 1787-1788, they
could plausibly argue that these opinions merited consideration
because they were formed at a moment when partisan wrangling
over a particular treaty was not a bias.s3 But if originalism could
thus be defended as a neutral mode of interpretation, the temptation to resort to it was manifestly political. It was dictated not
by the prior conviction that this was the most appropriate strategy to ascertain the meaning of the Constitution, but by considerations of partisan advantage.
That did not prevent commentators from forming opinions
with greater or lesser degrees of neutrality, nor did it banish the
ideal of neutrality from the temples of constitutional judgment.
It merely demonstrated that neutrality could rarely be attained
when the Constitution was so highly politicized, or when politics
were so highly constitutionalized. This was not what Madison
had intended in 1787, nor what he desired a decade later; but he
contributed as much to this result as any of his colleagues and
contemporaries, and he lived long enough to foresee its most
tragic implications.

83. Even this claim might be considered problematic. In 1788, concern over the
potential negotiation of a treaty of commerce with Spain, in which the United States
might abjure its rights to navigate the Mississippi and have. fr~e a~ess to t~e .~ulf of
Mexico, was a major impediment to ratification of the Constttutwn m both Vtrgtma and
North Carolina.

